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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
)
)
Defendants.
)

)
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,)
a Delaware Corporation,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Case No.

CV 2003 4621

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO SUBSTITUTE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST

Case No.

CV 2002 7671

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

I. BACKGROUND.
Although one decision is being filed in each of these two cases, these two cases
are not consolidated. At the November 27, 2007, hearing on various motions in both
cases, counsel for defendants in each of these two cases indicated on the record that he
would be pursuing a motion to consolidate on behalf of his clients. No such motion has
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discuss each case separately.
At the conclusion of the November 27, 2007, hearing, this Court stated that the
ruling on the upcoming summary judgment motion (heard November 28, 2007) would be
taken under advisement and that the decision on summary judgment would not be issued
until after this Court filed its decision on "Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12". This Court entered its "Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from
an Interlocutory Order, I.AR. 12" on November 30, 2007. On December 17, 2007,
defendants in both cases filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with the Idaho Supreme
Court. On January 25, 2008, this Court received notice that on January 17, 2008, the
Idaho Supreme Court denied defendants' Motion for Permissive Appeal in each of these
two cases. Accordingly, summary judgment in each of these two cases is at issue.
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion brought by plaintiffs in both cases
was heard November 28, 2007.
Capstar Radio Operating Company and Tower Sub Asset (collectively the
"Plaintiffs") filed suit to declare the existence of an easement over property owned by
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, the defendants in each of the two cases. Due to a
discovery dispute, summary judgment was limited to only the issue of express
easement. Oral argument on the express easement theory was heard in these two
cases at two different times. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of Tower
Asset Sub against Lawrences on May 27, 2005, and this Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Capstar against Lawrences on June 7, 2005. Lawrences appealed
this Court's finding of an express easement in both cases to the Idaho Supreme Court.
On January 26, 2007, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment in both

ca~~~~R~ Ye?mbR~J9'18E\n,s8t£ul4 ~~99ftfi~tiroceedings consistent with this
.. c:.,ncn.,n1 '"" nc:r.1c::1nN AI\Jn m:inFR r.RANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Capstar v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7; Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence,
2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7. The Supreme Court noted that although the plaintiffs did not
have an express easement, it appeared that the case might have been concluded on
summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs' other theories. The Idaho Supreme Court
wrote in Capstar: "It is unfortunate that the district court confined the summary
judgment proceeding to the express easement issue, as it appears the case might have
been brought to a conclusion based on evidence that was submitted with respect to
Capstar's other theories but not considered on summary judgment." Capstar v.
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7. A similar statement was made by the Idaho
Supreme Court in Tower Asset Sub, Inc.:
Final resolution of this case would have been expedited, had the district
court not con-fined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on
evidence submitted to the court, certain of the other theories showed
greater promise from Tower's standpoint and it is unfortunate that those
theories were not fully developed and decided upon.
Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7. On May 14, 2007, the
plaintiffs in each case filed a "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", which again
raised for this Court's consideration the other theories of easement advanced in
plaintiffs' previous motions for summary judgment, but not decided upon by this Court in
its initial decisions on summary judgment in 2005.
II. ANALYSIS REGARDING CAPSTAR RADIO OPERA TING CO. v. LAWRENCE.
A. Facts Pertaining to Capstar Radio Operating Co., v. Lawrence.
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and
Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain. Both the Capstar parcel and
the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were once part of a larger tract held under
common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. The Lawrence parcel was broken out
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 O
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in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Susan Weeks
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2,

i"f 1.e., Exhibit E),

and the Capstar

parcel was broken out in 1989 when Funks sold that parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting,
Inc. (Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5, ,I3.3,
Exhibit Q). The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and
the Capstar parcel is located to the east of the Lawrences' parcel in the southwest
quarter of Section 22. Section 21 lies directly west of Section 22. Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7,

,-r 8,

Exhibit Z. There is a

public road in the area known as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally to
the west of the Lawrence parcel, which in turn is west of Capstar's parcel. Capstar
seeks an easement to access its property from Signal Point Road over an unimproved
private road commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. Blossom Mountain Road
crosses through the Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In
litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken September 30,
2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone Corporation (GTC)
obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 over the private road
that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel). Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7, ,I,I 5-7, Exhibit W,
X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the
road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast through the southwest portion of
Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the north half of Section 28 were it then
turned northeast and entered the southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and
Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y.
Capstar and Tower Asset have proven the following chain of title for the parcels
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 0
involved in Sections 21 and 22:
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1. Reynolds to the Radens and the IVlarcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits A
and D.
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks-in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed
August 17, 2004), Exhibits Band C. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of IVlotion
for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits B and C.
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this
case.
Capstar and Tower Asset have established the title chain with respect to what
became the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as:
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992):
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2, 2004), E and I; Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit A and F.
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16,
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), . Exhibits F and H;
.
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Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H.
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and O;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0.
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and ,July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibits J and K.
5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 1996,
Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, M,
N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P.
Capstar ·establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits Q and R.

Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 o
-- - - -

- -·-· ·-- - - - · - · - - · ·

_. ....... ...................... -

..... A U"TU.1,..._ n1

AJJ.ITICCPC: I\A'f"\Tlf"l~I

9
i:ni:-

C::I IMM..O.S<'V

_IIJnt";;MFNT

Paqe 6

2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S.
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed
l\/larch 9, 2004), Exhibit T.
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit U.
Capstar asserts that prior .to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences'
parcel from the parent parcel in 1975, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had
been used by the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21
and 22. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 9,
2004), pp. 4-5,

,-m 7-9.

Capstar asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the

Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel.
Id., pp. 5-6,

,-m 10-12.

Capstar argues the road was also later used by Kootenai

Broadcasting, Inc. for access to its segregated parcel in Section 22. This claim is
proven by the Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 9, 2004. John Rook was the President of Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. Rook's
testimony is uncontroverted.
The chain of title as to both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel is set
forth in the Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 9, 2004, and attached exhibits thereto. In 1975, the Funks agreed to sell the
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. In 1992, the Funks gave Human
s~~gfJ~ti't~a~lff&RWae~'&i#t ~~Q8-~W.R, "given in fulfillment of those certain
MFMn1>11..,n1 IM nFrcl~lnl\l Al\ln nR11ER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the
conveyance of the above described property ... " This property passed through several
other hands before the Lawrences purchased it in 1996.
When the Lawrences questioned Capstar's right to access its property over the
portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed their property, Capstar filed suit on
November 7, 2002, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tower Asset filed a similar
suit on June 27, 2003. Capstar and Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared
based on four theories: express easement, easement by implication, easement by
necessity, and prescriptive easement. On plaintiffs' previous motion for summary
judgment, this court found that plaintiffs held an express easement over the Lawrence
property based on the sale agreement, as well as the deed. The Court did not address
Capstar's other theories. The Lawrences appealed from that decision and the Supreme
Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an express
easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, the plaintiffs renew their motion for
summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously advanced by
Capstar.

8. Easement by Implication from Prior Use.
An easement can be formed by implication from prior use. Creation of
easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the rule that written instruments
speak for themselves, and because implied easements are contrary to that rule, the
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 Idaho 396, 400, 422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966);

Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An
easement is implied because it is presumed that if an access was in use at the time of
severance it was meant to continue. Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 105 Idaho 535,

s_c

# 38300-?01 o
Capstar VS. Lawrence -542, 681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (CT App. TiffiZI} E.asements by implication rest on the view 11
----·-- · ··-· ••• ~~~•~•n.,

••m none:,:, r::1>ArJT1Nr. P! AINTIFF'S MOTION FDR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 8

that iand should not be rendered unfit for use due to a lack of access. Id.
In order to establish an easement by implication from prior use, the party
attempting to establish such easement must prove: 1) unity of title or ownership and
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; 2) apparent continuous use;
and 3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the
dominant estate. Bear Island Water Association v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 87 4
P.2d 528,536 (1994); Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087
(Ct.App. 1983); Close v. Rensick, 95 Idaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972); Davis
v. Gowen, 83 Idaho 204,210,360 P.2d. 403, 406-07. See also Phillips Industries, Inc.
v. Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 698, 827 P.2d 706, 711 (Ct. App. 1992); and Davis v.
Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999). Apparent continuous use

refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway
was intended to provide permanent access to the parcels. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 78,
665 P.2d at 1088. The party seeking to establish the easement has the burden of
providing the facts to establish the easement. Id., 105 Idaho at 77, 665 P.2d at 1087.
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1999), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that successors in interest to the original grantors of property could
assert easement rights by implied or prior use.
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior
use. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991
P.2d 362 (1999); Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2006).
Reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for
an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 Idaho at 642. Furthermore, the
easement by implication is not extinguished if the easement no longer exists or is no
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 O
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longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643. The Idaho Supreme Court further noted in
Davis:
This long standing rule is based on the theory that when someone
conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is required for the
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that
is required for the use and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently,
an easement implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent
duration, rather than a temporary easement which exists only as long as
the necessity continues. See, e.g., Norken v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622,
631 (Alaska 1991 ); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 593 P.2d 1138,
1145 (1979); Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla.1975). Additionally,
an implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore
passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient
estates. See Hughes v. State, 80 Idaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958); I.C. §
55-603 (stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements
attached to the property).
Id.
There can be no dispute that the first element has been proven. As to use and
reasonable necessity, Harold Funk testified in his affidavit that when he and his wife
Marlene purchased parts of Section 21 and 22 in 1969, there was "an existing private
easement road used for access that crossed the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and
entered into the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and provided access to these two
parcels and access to the General Telephone Company parcel [GTC owned about one
acre in Section 22]." Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 2, ,T1[ 2-3. This is the same easement road referenced in the Real Estate
Contract between Funks and their predecessor in interest, the Radens, over which
General Telephone Company had a recorded easement for access. Id. p. 2, 1[ 3,
Exhibit A. This was the Funks only access into Section 21. Id. p. 3, 1[ 4. When Funks
sold their portion of Section 21 to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor) in
1975, Funks still owned their land in Section 22, and the sales agreement to Human
~~ti~n~!iw@lo~rn~f'dr:ht"ga§~~~&meement that" ... indicated that the Section
""""""••1n1 ,., ni=r1c::1nPJ APJn nRnFR GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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21 parcel was being sold subject to an ingress/egress easement over the existing road
on the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." Id. p. 3,

~

6. Without

those terms Funks' Section 21 property would have been landlocked, and that was not
Harold Funk's intent. Id. Harold Funk testified that following the sale [to Human
Synergistics], we continuously utilized the existing road in Section 21 to access Funks'
property in Section 22. Id. p. 4, ~- 6. That Sales Agreement was recorded as well. Id.
In 1989 Funks sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc.,
and Funks knew Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. was going to use that parcel for
construction of a broadcasting tower. Id. p. 4, ~ 8. Rook testified that he used this road
several times to access the Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. Affidavit of John Rook
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, ,T 4.
Apparent continuous use from no later than 1975 is also shown by the Affidavit
of Wynn Wenker. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed March 9, 2004, Exhibit FF at ~10. The Farmanian - Mack Agreement
and Quit Claim Deed attached also infers that there is a road across the Section 21
property, the Farmanian property at that time. Id. Exhibit EE.

Harold Funk's Affidavit

indicates that the road subject to this action is the only road onto the property. Affidavit
of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, ~,T 3, 4.

Harold

Funk further indicates that it was their intent to include an easement in the transfer to
Human Synergistics so the property in Section 22 would not be landlocked. Id.

~

6.

Similarly, John Rook's Affidavit states that when Kootenai Broadcasing purchased from
the Funks (at a later time in 1989), this road that is subject of this dispute was the only
access to the property now held by Capstar. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, ,T 6.
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 o
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Capstar noticed their Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on April 14,
2004. Just prior to that hearing, Lawrences prose made discovery motions related to
information Rook and Funk had. Because such discovery was not relevant to the
express easement theory, discovery was allowed and Capstar's motion for summary
judgment proceeded on the express easement theory alone. The Idaho Supreme Court
has ruled on that issue. On March 23, 2004, Lawrences prose filed Defendants
Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. In that
pleading Lawrences claim, with a reference to a Metzker Map, that Capstar has access
to its parcel via Mellick Road. Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to Plaitiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. On April 6, 2004, Capstar filed an Affidavit of
Kelvin Brownsberger, the Road Supervisor for Post Falls Highway District. He testified
in his affidavit that Post Falls Highway District has not constructed and maintained
Mellick Road beyond its entry into Section 15, well short of Section 21 or Section 22.
Even if Lawrences had created an issue of fact as to an alternate route (they have not),
the Idaho Supreme Court in Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367
(1999) held only "reasonable necessity" is needed for an easement by implication, not
strict necessity which is needed in an implied easement by necessity.
Lawrences made one other argument in Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17. Lawrences claim Wilber Mead
testified he kept his gate locked from1966 until 1998, that the only party that had a key
to the gate was General Telephone Company, that Mead granted Furiks an easement
in 1972 and that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975; thus, Funks could have only
used the property for three years instead of the requisite five. Id. Lawrences cite to the
Affidavit of Doug las Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences' Reply in
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 o
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document exists. Only the cover page of Douglas Lawrence's Affidavit is filed.
Capstar argues that Mead only stated "to his knowledge" Mr. Funk was not using
the road, that Mead indicates he gave a key to GTE, but Mead has no knowledge as to
whether GTE gave a copy of the key to Funk or any knowledge that Funk did not go
around the gate. Capstar also argues there is no evidence to support Lawrences's
allegation that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975. Plaintiffs Reply Brief in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4.
In Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment filed May 14, 2007, Capstar reiterates the same facts, law and arguments it
made in 2004. Lawrences, through their attorney, filed their "Opposition of Douglas and
Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary ..Judgment of Plaintiff' on .July 24, 2007. In
that brief, Lawrences essentially argue that since Funks had no right to cross Section
28 (Section 28 lies immediately to the south of Section 22 in which Lawrences' parcel is
contained and Blossom Mountain Road dips from Section 22, down to Section 28,
before reaching Section 21 ), they have no right to cross Blossom Mountain Road as it
crosses Lawrences' land. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for
Summary ..Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 4-5. Capstar correctly notes that in this lawsuit the
owner of Section 28 is not a party. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Capstar's access, or lack thereof, over the portion of
Blossom Mountain Road as it travels through Section 28 is simply not an issue before
this Court. Finally, Lawrences again argue Capstar and their predecessor Funk had the
ability to access their land via Mellick Road.

Opposition of Douglas and Brenda

Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 6. On August 2, 2007,
Capstar filed "Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
J~cftrR~Ef{t~9:.:~ar 12:'2Jrrectrft,dfn1~~9Pt~9i1 Rothing in Bruce Anderson's Affidavit
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(Attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence filed July 24, 2007), nothing
in the Viewer's Report and nothing in Loudin v. Stokes (a 1987 District Court decision
by District Judge Gary M. Haman which shows it was related to Section 15 and Mellick
Road, Exhibit C to Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary
Judgment filed July 24, 2007), demonstrate that Funks could access their Section 22
property from Mellick Road because the Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of
Section 21. Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 3.
After Capstar filed its reply brief on summary judgment, on September 10, 2007,
Lawrences filed yet another brief on summary judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P.
56(c)), this one entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat, word for word the brief
Lawrences filed on July 24, 2007, as it pertains to implied easements from prior use.
No request for a jury trial has ever been made in Capstar v. Lawrence.
Accordingly, "When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court
as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L. C., 140 Idaho
354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004).
In the Capstar case, there is unity of title at the time of the severance of the
dominant and servient estate. The road was in use by the Funks at the time of the
severance and served as their sole access to the Section 21 and Section 22 properties
they retained. Thus, it was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the dominant
estate, Funk's Section 22 property at the time of severance. Capstar has met its
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 o
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property.
C. Easement by Necessity.

Capstar correctly notes that an easement by necessity has some similar
elements to an easement by prior use. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 13. The elements are: (1) that the dominant parcel and the
servient parcel were once part of a larger tract under common ownership; (2) that the
necessity for the easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the
severance; and (3) the present necessity for the claimed easement is great. Id., citing
B&J Development & Inv. Inc. v. Parsons, 126 Idaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, 52 (Ct.App.

1994), MacCaskil/v. Ebbert, 112 Idaho 1115, 1118, 739 P.2d 414,417 (Ct.App. 1987);
Bob.Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 543, 681 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Ct.App

1984). See also, Bearlsland WaterAss'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,725,874 P.2d
528, 536 (1994). Capstar added little in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13.
There is no dispute that the first element exists.
As to the second and third elements, Lawrences prose made an argument
unsupported by the law, that because "Funks and [Capstar] don't have a legal
easement to get to the Lawrence property to cross it", necessity does not exist.
Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 18. This argument was noted by the Court in its analysis of an implied easement
from prior use. Since the owner of Section 28 is not a party to this lawsuit, Lawrences'
argument is without merit.
Capstar claims that Kelvin Brownsberger's affidavit contradicts Lawrences' claim
that there is access via Mellick Road based upon a Metsker's map. Plaintiff's Reply
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 O
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Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. Because Brownsberger does
not tell us in his affidavit when he became familiar with Mellick Road, nor does he tell us
when he began working for the Post Falls Highway District, Brownsberger cannot
discuss what existed back in 1969 when Funk's purchased or what existed back in
1975 when Funks sold to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor). What is
pertinent is what existed at severance in 1975. The Metsker's map (at the August 7,
2007 hearing on motions to strike, this Court took judicial notice that Metsker maps
have been relied upon for decades, but not as to their accuracy) is not sufficient to
contradict Howard Funk's testimony. The only competent evidence of what existed in
1975 is from Howard Funk. Funk stated: "The private easement road was the only
existing road providing access to the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and the
Southwest Quarter of Section 22" and when they severed the property in 1975 the sales
agreement referenced that private road and that the Section 21 property being sold to
Human Synergistics, Inc., was being sold subject to an ingress egress easement over
the existing road, and that it was not their intent to landlock the Section 22 property.
Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3, ,-r,-r 4, 6.
John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later time in 1989 when
Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land. Rook testified in his affidavit that in
1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funks'
parcels in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3,

fflT 4, 6.

Finally, John Mack's affidavit makes it

clear that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks' parcels in 1992 when Mack
purchased. Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants Lawrences Reply in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004.

.
.
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- s.c # 38~00-?0to
· Lawrences then maRe1ne argTJmeilrnrat: "Funk obviously had access to his
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other lands when he severed the parcel sold to Hyman Synergistics in 1975, otherwise
Funk would have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to
Human Synergistics in 1975." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion
for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. The identical argument is made in Opposition
of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 10-

11. This argument by Lawrences actually cuts against Lawrences quite clearly when
one considers the uncontradicted fact that Funks in their Sale Agreement to Human
Synergistics, Inc., stated that "the Section 21 parcel being sold was subject to an
ingress egress easement over the existing road on the property that was being sold to
Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 3,

,r 6).

Just as the Lawrences argue, Funks actually did take great care

to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human Synergistics in 1975;
however, they errantly put that language in the Sale Agreement. That is why there is no
express easement. But the reason there is no express easement is perhaps the most
convincing evidence as to the implied easement theories ... Funks needed to, intended
to, and thought they did reserve an easement across the Human Synergistics land (now
Lawrences land) when they sold to Human Synergistics in 1975. At all times thereafter
Funks used this road as if they had every right in the world to use it. This Court finds
that the second element of easement by necessity exists ... the necessity for the
easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the severance in 1975.
Capstar argues that the third element, present great necessity for the easement,
is supported by the Affidavit of Thomas Mack. Mack's affidavit does indicate Mellick
Road does not pass over Funks' property, and Mack's affidavit indicates that even
Mack had no access to Mellick Road until he made an agreement with Fred Zuber, who
Capstar VS. Law(enpe.-- s C # 3R~09-?B1 n
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the north face of Blossom Mountain." Mack also testified "Over the years, the road had
been completely abandoned" and "It did not appear that anyone had used the road for
nearly 20 years." Capstar also argues "As demonstrated on the assessor's map
included as Exhibit 'A' to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of 1\/lotion to Strike Lawrence
Affidavit filed 7/24/07, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast Quarter
and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22", and "Funks never owned either of these
parcels." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 13; Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence Testimony, filed
August 4, 2007, Exhibit A.
This Court finds there is no question of fact as to whether the present necessity
for the claimed easement is great. There is no evidence that Capstar has any other
access other than the Blossom Mountain Road access which is the subject of this
litigation.

D. Easement by Prescription.
An easement by prescription was not raised in Capstar's initial Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 9, 2004, nor did Lawrences
discuss the theory in their prose Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. Capstar did not raise
the theory in its Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed
April 6, 2004. The first time the issue of a prescriptive easement was raised was in
Capstar's 1\/lemorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 1112.
Capstar argues the road was established as early as 1966, and that it is
undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S C ti 38'.i00-?01 n
Section 22 parcels. Id. p. 1-z.· Capsrar a-rgues that when Funks sold the Section 21
-- --

-- •

~, ..... ._,,,_

... ,

·•ru·"'t"'.''~ unT1n~1 cn0 c:.11MMARY

"'"' 1

.JUDGMENT

21
Page 18

parcel to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales
contract language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for
ingress and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. Id. Capstar argues this
language provided notice to others that they were claiming a right to use the road in the
future for ingress and egress to the lands the Funks retained, and that it is undisputed
that Funks and their predecessors (successors) then proceeded to use the road openly,
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for the statutory period. Id.
Capstar notes the Idaho Supreme Court in Akers v. D. L. White Construction,
Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (2005) held:

A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the
subject property, which is characterized as: 1) open and notorious; (2)
continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4)
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient
tenement (5) for the statutory period." (citation omitted). The statutory
period in question is five years. (citations omitted). A claimant may rely
on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite
five continuous years of use." (citation omitted). Once the claimant
presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the
use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and
under a claim of right. (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the
owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. (citations
omitted).
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12.

A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by
permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of
the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006).
Lawrences argue that Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive.
22
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Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. Footnote five of Lawrences' brief cites the Court to the "affidavits of
Daniel Rebar [sic, actually RebeorJ and Douglas Lawrence" to support this claim. There
are several Douglas Lawrence affidavits filed in this matter. The Affidavit of Douglas
Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment filed July 24, 2007, indicates
just the opposite, that Capstar's use of the land at least when Lawrences came into
possession of the land, was anything but permissive:
25. Since taking title to the land, I have worked hard to protect my
private property rights from illegal trespass. I have maintained one or
more locks on my gate, placed no trespass signs at various points on the
property, stopped and turned back people who cannot demonstrate a
legal right to use the road, and have actively attempted to engage the
local Sheriff's office on many occasions to get their support. Between
May 2000, and October 2003, l have filed over 10 separate crime reports
with the Kootenai County Sheriff's office for vandalism, trespass,
destruction of personal property, and for leaving my gate open and
unlocked. These Crime Reports are attached and included herein as
Exhibit 'T'.
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment filed
July 24, 2007, p. 9 (unnumbered pages), ,I 25. Douglas Lawrence's affidavit
contradicts the claim his attorney makes on his behalf. Lawrences' claim that use of
the land has always been permissive flies in the face of the fact that the genesis of this
lawsuit was Lawrences "periodically locked the gate which they placed across the
Blossom Mountain Road in an effort to deny Capstar its right of access over and across
the Blossom Mountain Road." Complaint for Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction, p. 6,

,I XVlV (XIX).
Douglas Lawrence's affidavit claims that prior to 2001, "Capstar's use of the road
as it crosses my land was permissive." Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of
Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24, 2007, p. 14 (unnumbered pages),

1i

49, Exhibit M. Douglas Lawrence cites to Capstar's response to Lawrences' Request
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38~00-201 n
for Admission No. 85 which reads: 'PTease 'admit that, prior to 2001, Defendants
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Lawrence did not use any gate to restrict Plaintiff Capstar's Vehicular access", to which
Capstar responded: "Admit that the gate has always been on the road since Capstar's
predecessors in title acquired the Capstar parcel was not locked and did not obstruct
either Capstar or its predecessors in title's access until it was locked by Lawrence." Id.
The fact that the gate is not locked may be evidence of Lawrences' acquiescence of
others, including Capstar, to travel this road, it may be evidence of Lawrences'
indifference of others, including Capstar, travelling this road, and it may be evidence of
Lawrences' ignorance of anyone, including Capstar travelling this road, but it is not
evidence that Lawrences or their predecessors gave Capstar or its predecessors
permission to use this road. "Mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient
basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of
the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973).
Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive"
ignores the fact that Lawrences did not purchase their property until 1996. Thus, in the
years from 1966 to 1996, they are not competent to testify as to anything that occurred
in that period.
Lawrences cite the affidavit of Daniel Rebar [Rebeor] for their claim that
Capstar's use of the road was permissive. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. There is an Affidavit
of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed July 22,
2003. A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he managed the tower site for Capstar, and
that "On November 3, 1997, Nextel West Corp. entered into an "Access License
Agreement" with Doug las and Brenda Lawrence in an effort to avoid litigation regarding
access to a leased parcel upon which it was locating a communications tower ... "
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38JQ0-201G
Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor, p. 2, i1i1 2,--Z. On January 13, 2003, Nextel assigned the24
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Access License Agreement to Capstar. Id.

iT 4.

The uncontroverted evidence is the

license was entered into in 1997 "in an effort to avoid litigation". That certainly is not
evidence that there was permissive use of the road at that time. It is evidence of just
the opposite, that Lawrences were claiming Capstar had no right to use the road.
Certainly the assignment of a license would stop the adverse period from running per
the quoted portion of Akers, but the evidence has not been contradicted by Lawrences
that from 1966 to 2003 Capstar and their predecessors used this road under a claim of
right.
Capstar's uncontradicted evidence is as follows: Harold Funk testified in his
affidavit that: "Following the sale [in 1975], we continuously utilized the existing road in
Section 21 to access our property in Section 22 without interference." Affidavit of
Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, -filed March 9, 2004, p. 4,

1i

6. John Rook testified in his affidavit that when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased
its parcel in 1989:
There were other nearby parcels used for towers further east from
the parcel purchased by Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., including a parcel of
property owned and used by General Telephone Company. At the time
that Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcels, these property
owners and their tenants were using the road to access their parcels, and
continued to do so after Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcel.
Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9,
2004, p. 2, ,T3.
The existing private access road was visible and in use by Funks at
the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel. I have personally
driven this road and used it on several occasions to access the Kootenai
Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. The private road was the only road that
provided access to Kootenai Broadcasting, lnc.'s parcel of property.
Id. p. 3,

iT 4.
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Funks) ability to obtain a prescriptive easement. First, Lawrences claim "In 1975, Funk
moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, Idaho, where he has resided since.
(Funk Deposition, hereinafter 'FD' 28:20 to 28:24.). Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. Lawrences then argue:
"After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom Mountain only two or
three times (FD 30:25 to 31 :4)" and "Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land
since 1981 (FD 31:17)." Id., p. 5. What Lawrences omit from that same deposition is
the following:
Q. BY MR. WHELAN: Now between the time you bought the property

and the time you sold it to Human Synergistics, how many times did you
go up to the property?
A. Well, we'd always go up andpick huckleberries and stuff, and target
practice and - I don't know. I would have to guess maybe, I don't know,
20, 30 times.
Q. In the two year period, well three years since 1969. I'm sorry. Sixyear period, from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on top of the
mountain?
A. I would suppose, yeah.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit A (August 17, 2007 Deposition of Harold Funk), p. 25, LI. 11-23.
Lawrences fail to realize that Funk's use of his property and the use he made of the
Lawrence property in getting to his property from 1975 to the present is not relevant.
The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk used the property consistently for the six-

year period from the day he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the
area. This is one year more than the five years required for the prescriptive use.
This isn't the type of property of which one would expect daily use. The property is on
top of a mountain. Capstar seeks this easement to maintain its radio equipment on top
of this mountain. The use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funks

26
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It is the long established rule in this jurisdiction [Idaho] that any right gained
by prescription is confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive
period. "It is limited by the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to
which it is put."
Idaho Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed lmporvement Dist., 112 Idaho 512, 515,

733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 Idaho
566, 568, 602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979). "[P]resciption acts as a penalty against a landowner
and thus the rights obtained by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by
the courts. Id., citing Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977). The
character and extent of a prescriptive easement generally is fixed and determined by the
use under which it was acquired. No different or materially greater use can be made of
such an easement, except by further adverse use for the prescriptive period. 25
Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses§ 81.
The uncontroverted evidence is the road was established as early as 1966, and
it is undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and
Section 22 parcels. It is uncontradicted that when Funks sold the Section 21 parcel to
Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales contract
language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for ingress
and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. It is uncontradicted that Funks in
fact made use of that road. This language in the recorded sales contract provided
notice to others that Funks were claiming a right to use the road in the future for ingress
and egress to the lands the Funks retained. The uncontroverted evidence is that Funks
and their successors relied on that language in the recorded sales contract as it is
undisputed that Funks and their successors then proceeded to use the road openly,
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for much longer than the

27
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E. Lawrences' New Defenses of Laches and Statute of Limitations.

On September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Leave to File Amended
Answer, requesting to add the additional defense of !aches. This motion to amend was
granted and an order to that effect was filed on September 26, 2007. Also on
September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed another brief on summary judgment, this one
entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment
of Plaintiff'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat their arguments made in their brief filed July
24, 2007, regarding implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity and
easement by prescription. Lawrences claim additional facts not in dispute. Finally,
Lawrences also added a brief argument on Statute of Limitations and a one paragraph
argument regarding laches.

Lawrences also filed on September 10, 2007, an "Affidavit

of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment" and an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Leave to Amend." On September 17, 2007, Capstar filed "Plaintiff's
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment".
1) Statute of Limitations.

Lawrences argue Idaho Code§ 5-203 and 5-204 apply to bar Capstar's claims.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, p. 6. Lawrences provide no legal analysis to support that argument. Idaho
Code§ 5-203 is not a statue of limitation. It simply sets forth the number of years a
plaintiff in an action must be in possession of the property in question before filing a
lawsuit to adverse possess that property. Idaho Code § 5-204 is also not a statute of
limitation, but, simply a statute setting forth the number of years a party must be seized
Capstar VS. Lawrenc,e -- S c # ~R'.10R-2n1 n
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not just the plaintiff as in I.C. § 5-203, and it applies to defenses and to prescriptive
easements, where I.C. § 5-203 only concerns prescriptive possession of property.
Lawrences argue: "Plaintiff's complaint makes no reference to its predecessors
interest". Id. First, Lawrences completely fail to explain the legal significance of that
claim. There can be no legal basis for this argument, as both I.C. § 5-203 and § 5-204
specifically mention a party's predecessor. Idaho case law has long since recognized
this fact that a party's predecessor's use of property or time in possession can be
tacked on to the party's use or time in possession to achieve the requisite number of
years. Akers v. D. L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206
(2005); Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 975 (2003); State ex rel.
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,146,594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979); Marsha/Iv. Blair, 130

Idaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Second, from a factual standpoint,
Lawrences' claim is false. Capstar's Complaint, p. 6,

,r XVII alleges:

"Capstar and its

predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously,
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years."
Lawrences next argue: "Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to
be pertected." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary
Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. Again, there is no explanation as to the legal basis of this
claim. Such argument is squarely contradicted by Idaho Code§ 5-203, § 5-204, and
the analysis of Hodgins, Haman, Marshall and Akers.
2) Laches.

Lawrences entire argument on !aches is as follows:
Whether or not a party is guilty of !aches is ordinarily a question of
fact. Osterlich v.State of Idaho, 100 Idaho 702, 604 P.2d 716. It is
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

29
Pa!le 26

beyond question that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged
stale claims which Plaintiff now seeks to enforce. If Plaintiff and its
predecessors truly enjoyed easements by implication, necessity and/or by
prescriptive use, those claims should have been perfected through
litigation. The failure to pursue the claims by Plaintiff's predecessors has
clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and their predecessors to
defend against the claims.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, p. 7. (italics in original). While Lawrences claim it is "beyond question" that
Lawrences have been prejudiced, there is not one fact alleged, not one bit of argument
stating why this is so. Similarly, there is no factual or legal argument made why
Capstar's claims or Capstar's predecessor's "claims should have been perfected
through litigation." The obvious flaw to Lawrences' unsupported argument is prior to
Lawrences purchasing their property and subsequently denying Capstar access, there
was no need to litigate! Every indication is that as soon as Lawrences prohibited
Capstar's access, Capstar took action. Capstar simply is not "guilty of !aches."
There is absolutely no merit to either of Lawrences' defenses of statute of
limitations or ]aches.
II. ANALYSIS REGARDING TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. v. LAWRENCE.
A. Facts Pertaining to Tower Asset Sub, Inc., v. Lawrence.
As a preliminary matter, on November 13, 2007, Tower Asset filed a "Motion for
Substitution of Real Party in Interest." The basis for this motion is Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. became Tower Asset Sub, L.L.C., and on February 23, 2007, Tower Asset Sub,
L.L.C. merged into Spectra Site, L.L.C., a different Deleware Corporation. Affidavit of
Raymond W. Goodwin in Support of Substitution of Real Party in Interest. This motion
was heard on November 28, 2007, just prior to oral argument on Capstar's summary
judgment motion. At the end of oral argument on the Motion for Substitution of Real
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010
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prepare an order. No order has been prepared to date. Since no order has been
entered until this decision and order, the Court will continue to refer to the plaintiff in this
action as Tower Asset Sub, Inc., (Tower Asset) even though the Court has granted the
motion to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest.
Tower Asset has made it clear that it is only seeking injunctive relief in this case,
and that Tower Asset is not making any claim to title over Lawrences' land. Plaintiff's
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1.
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and the
Halls (through whom Tower Asset claims its right) own parcels of property on Blossom
Mountain. Both the Halls' parcel and the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were
once part of a larger tract held under common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk.
The Lawrence parcel was broken out in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human
Synergistics. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset Case filed August 17, 2004), p. 2, ,i 2.e., Exhibit E. The Halls' parcel was
broken out in 1996 when Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen. Id., Exhibit Q. The
Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Halls' parcel
is located to the east in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Id. Section 21 lies directly
west of Section 22. Id., p. 6, ,i 8, Exhibit Z. There is a public road in the area known
as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally West of the Lawrence parcel,
which in turn is west of Hall's parcel. Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an
easement to access its equipment located on Halls' property which Tower Asset leases
from the Halls. The easement is located on an unimproved private road commonly
known as Blossom Mountain Road as Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the
Lawrence parcel. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition
ta~§~t¥~b6i3W~~3~ ~&lgh~~gf:h-of-way easement General Telephone
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Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences'
parcel). Id., pp. 6-7, ~r,} 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road
prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then
travels southeast through the southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then
enters the North Half of Section 28 where it then turned northeast and entered the
southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y.
Tower Asset asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' parcel
from the parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by
the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 and 22.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (field August 17, 2004), pp.
4-5,

iTiT 7-9. Tower Asset asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the

Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel.
Id., pp. 5-6,

,m 10-11.

Capstar and Tower Asset prove the following chain of title for the parcels
involved in Sections 21 and 22:
1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D.
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed
August 17, 2004), Exhibits Band C.
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this
case.

?RlRe title chain with respect to what became 32
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the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as:
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992):
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2, 2004), E and I; Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit A and F.
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16,
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004 ), Exhibits F and H.
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and O;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0.
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibits J and K.
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5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12,
1996, Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L,
M, N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P.
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibit Exhibits Q and R.
2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S.
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T.
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit U.
Tower Asset establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Hall property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
1. Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August
17, 2004), Exhibit 0.
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 o
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2. Rasmussen to VanSky (Deed September 29, 1978): Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case
filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit R.
3. Van Sky to Switzer Communications, Inc. (Deed December 11,,1981 ):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit S.
4. Switzer Communications, Inc. to Term Corp. (Deed December 8, 1982):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit T.
5. Term Corp. to Mark E. Hall and Robert A. Hall (Deed April 16, 1997);
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit U.
6.

Spectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest with Mark Hall and Robert
Hall in a Parcel of property situated in the Southwest quarter of Section
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Mer4idian, Kootenai
County, Idaho. Affidavit of Dan Rebeor (Tower Asset case filed July 22,
2003).

VVhen the Lawrences questioned Tower Asset's right to access the property it
leases from the Halls over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed
Lawrences', Tower Asset filed suit on June 27, 2003, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared based on four theories:
express easement, easement by implication, easement by necessity, and prescriptive
easement. On Tower Asset's previous motion for summary judgment, this court found
that Tower Asset held an express easement over the Lawrence property based on the
~~Pes1~r¥e9n~A\~fu~1r-a§.fhe~~~~9~&MPGranting Motion for Summary Judgment 35
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and Entering Decree of Quiet Title, filed May 27, 2005. The Court did not address
Tower Asset's other theories raised in its Complaint due to a discovery issue at the
time. Accordingly, Tower Asset and Lawrences in that initial motion for summary
judgment did not address theories of easement by implication, easement by necessity
and prescriptive easement. The Lawrences appealed from that decision, and the
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an
express easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, Tower Asset renews its
motion for summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously
raised in their complaint.
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc., while
retaining the southwest quarter of Section 22. Tower Asset asserts that although its
origins are unknown, it is apparent that an easement over the road existed as early as
1966. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken
September 30, 2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone
Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences'
parcel). Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 67,

im 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y.

The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's

engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast
through the Southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the North
Half of Section 28 were it then turned northeast and entered the Southeast quarter of
Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y.
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-?.01 n
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parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by the
Funks as an exclusive means to access their property. That same road was later used
by Hall for access to their segregated parcel in Section 22. Affidavit of Robert Hall in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3,

,m 7, 8.

In 1992, the Funks executed

and delivered a warranty deed conveying the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics.
The warranty deed stated that the deed was given "in fulfillment of those certain
contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the
conveyance of the above described property." In 1996, after a number of other
intermediate conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their parcel.
The Idaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right to
use the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v.
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4.
Lawrences also claim Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant and
that Tower Asset has no standing to seek to quiet title across Lawrences' land.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, pp. 1, 2, 9, 10. A copy of the lease between Nextel Communications and Hall
is included with the Affidavit of Robert Hall. Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 2,

,m 3, 4, Exhibit A.

Hall received notice that this lease was

assigned to Tower Parent Corp., and Tower Asset Sub, Inc., and that Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Id. p. 2,

,m 4, 5. Additionally, the Supreme

Court in Tower Asset, Inc., v. Lawrence, supra, noted that: "We hold that Tower, as
lesselP§tcUi&'~l~~~n-a~<es#i®,~-~fa'He!ing to seek injunctive relief preventing
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the Lawrence's from interfering with its right to sue the easement." Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. The Idaho Supreme Court also held:

"Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an alleged
legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement." Id. Lawrences'
argument that Tower Asset lacks standing to pursue easement theories of implication
or necessity (Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 6-7) is without merit. Lawrences admit Tower Asset
has standing to prove an easement by prescription. Id., p. 7.
Lawrences next argue that Hall has no easement by necessity or implication and
thus has nothing to assign to Tower Asset, and that the only theory available to Tower
Asset is easement by prescription. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1-3, 8. Tower Asset now argues that
nothing presented by the Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset
has standing as a lessee of the dominant estate. Tower Asset correctly argues "the
only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower
Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road
easement of its landlord, Halls." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 2. (emphasis added). This is because the Idaho Supreme
Court noted in Footnote 1 that: "Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall
parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrence
parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4.
In accordance with 28A C.J.S. Easements§ 164 (1996), Tower Asset argues
that while a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the
owner of the way, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as well as by persons
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 O
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transacting business with him, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary.
Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2.
Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there is nothing contained in the copy of the
lease between Tower Asset and Hall that demonstrates a special agreement between
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may not use an easement for which the Halls
have the benefit. Id. at p. 3. Hence, Tower Asset argues they are entitled to injunctive
relief. Id.
Lawrences argue that Tower Asset is not the Halls' tenant since the Halls and
Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 10. The lease between Nextel and the Halls has a provision that reads:
"Lessee may not assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest in this
Agreement or in the Premises without the prior written consent of Lessors ... " Affidavit
of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, ,i 14. Tower
Asset re-characterizes Lawrences argument as follows: "Essentially, Lawrences argue
that Hall may not waive a contract clause." Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Tower Asset correctly
states that as long as the Halls and Tower Asset are in agreement that they share a
tenant/landlord relationship pursuant to the lease, Lawrences may not challenge that
relationship. Id.

The uncontroverted evidence by Robert Hall is" ... that Tower Asset

Sub, Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, ,i,i 4, 5, Exhibit A. This Court finds the
uncontroverted evidence shows that Hall and Tower Asset are in agreement that they
share a landlord and tenant relationship. As noted by Tower Asset, "No law requires
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 o
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of the term." Plaintiffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 3. Obviously, Hall and Nextel either agreed to waive the
assignment term, or they simply are not concerned with that provision. There is no
assignment issue at issue here. Quite simply, the Lawrences are not in privity to the
leasing agreement between Nextel and the Halls, or the agreement between Nextel's
assignee, Tower Asset, and the Halls. Therefore, Tower Asset is correct in asserting its
right to use the Halls' easement over Lawrences' land. Tower Asset is entitled to
injunctive relief.
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, "Tower presented uncontroverted
evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road
across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No.
14, p. 4. Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstar's easement by implication from
prior use, easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls.
The only additional argument made by Lawrences as to an easement by prescription is
that Lawrences argue that Tower Asset itself makes no claim that it has used the
Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously, and in a hostile manner for the
statutory period. Lawrences' argument continues that since no prescriptive claim has
been established by Tower Asset and since Tower Asset's use of the road has always
been permissive, a prescriptive easement cannot exist. The Court's analysis above
explains why these arguments have no merit. The only additional argument made by
Lawrences as to an implied easement by prior use is Lawrences assert that the parcel
at issue in the Tower Asset case was not created or severed from the Funks' other
lands until 1977 (as opposed to 1975 in the Capstar case) when Funk conveyed the
property to Rasmussen/Chamberlain. Lawrences argue that because there was no
e~saJl~karit YnS1 ~~9-rtneSs~rJfe~f~QfkftPJ.Qs severed from the dominant estate, and 40
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therefore no prior use, Tower Asset has failed to meet the second element of an
implied easement. This Court has already explained why there was an easement by
implication, from prior use and by prescription in 1975.
As lessee from Halls, Tower Asset is entitled to injunctive relief against
Lawrences as to use of this easement across Lawrences' land for use of this road
known as Signal Point Road.
Just as in the Capstar case, Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the
arguments of statute of limitations and laches. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 8-9. The analysis
above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case. Lawrences cannot avail
themselves of those defenses for the reasons stated above.
Ill. ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judmgnet
filed in Tower Asset Sub, inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are GRANTED. In the
Capstar case, Capstar has proven they have an implied easement by prior use, an

easement by necessity, and an easement by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to
establish a material fact as to any other these theories. In the Capstar case,
Lawrences have failed to establish a material fact in dispute as to any of these theories.
The defenses of laches and statute of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in
the Capstar case.
In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to injunctive
relief, as their landlord, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences land established
by prior use, by necessity and by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to establish a
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-201 O
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material fact in dispute as to any of these theories. The defenses of laches and statute
of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in the Tower Asset case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in the Tower Asset case, that Tower Asset's motion
to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest is GRANTED.
th

Entered this 6 day of February, 2008.
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Douglas P. Lawrence, Pro Se
Brenda J. Lawrence, Pro Se
Post Office Box 1027
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816-1027
Telephone: (208)-704-0644
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COivIP ANY, a Delaware Corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS P. LA WREN CE and
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, Husband
and Wife

Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-02-07671
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS
LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
FINAL JUDGMENT

)
) ss.
)

I, Douglas P. Lawrence, after being duly sworn upon my oath, depose and say:
1. I make this Affidavit of my own personal knowledge. I am over the age of 18. I
am knowledgeable of the facts and issues regarding this matter and am competent to
testify to the facts contained in this affidavit.

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ENTRY
OF FINAL JUDGMENT
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 35120
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)
)
)
)
)

Coeur d'Alene, April 2010 Term
2010 Opinion No. 86
Filed: August 25, 2010

)

)
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants-Appellants.
)

Stephen Kenyon, Clerk
AMENDED OPINION, THE
COURT'S PRIOR OPINION
DATED JULY 26, 2010 IS
HEREBY WITHDRAWN

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge.
The appeal is dismissed.
Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Coeur d'Alene, prose appellants.
Douglas Lawrence argued.
James, Vernon & Weeks, P.A., Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Susan Weeks
argued.

HORTON, Justice
This case involves the question whether Capstar Radio Operating Company (Capstar)
holds an easement over the land of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (the Lawrences) to access a
radio transmitter located in Kootenai County. It is related to Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence,
No. 35119-2008, also before this Court.
The Lawrences appeal from the district court's memorandum decision and order granting
Capstar's motion for summary judgment. Because we do not have jurisdiction to decide this
case, we dismiss this appeal.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Lawrences and Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain, south of Post
Falls, Idaho. In 2002, Capstar filed this action seeking recognition of an easement over the
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property owned by the Lawrences to maintain and repair a radio transmitter located on Capstar's
property. Tower Asset Sub Inc. (Tower) filed a similar action in 2003. Capstar moved for
summary judgment on express, implied, and prescriptive easement theories.

After the

Lawrences complained that Capstar was being unresponsive to their discovery requests, the
district court ruled solely on the express easement theories. It found that an express easement
existed based upon an earlier contract between two other parties. The Lawrences appealed and
this Court reversed, finding that no express easement over the Lawrence property was retained
by Capstar's predecessor in interest. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704,
708, 152 P.3d 575, 579 (2007).
On remand, Capstar renewed its motion for summary judgment on the remaining theories

of an easement by implication from prior use, an easement by necessity, and a prescriptive
easement. The Lawrences subsequently filed a motion for disqualification of the district judge.
The district judge heard evidence and issued a written decision declining to disqualify himself.
On February 6, 2008, the district court issued a combined decision in both the Capstar and the
related Tower cases captioned as a "Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Real Party
in Interest" (the Memorandum Decision).

The district court found that an easement by

implication from prior use or, in the alternative, an easement by necessity or a prescriptive
easement had arisen over the Lawrence property. The district court rejected the Lawrences'
defenses. There is no judgment in the record. The Lawrences now appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time on its own
initiative. T.J.T., Inc. v. Mori, 148 Idaho 825, 826, 230 P.3d 435, 436 (2010) (citing In re
Quesnell Dairy, 143 Idaho 691, 693, 152 P.3d 562, 564 (2007)). Indeed, ''this Court is always

obligated to ensure its own jurisdiction." State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 353, _ , 233 P.3d 1275, 1278
n. 3 (2010) (citing Highlands Dev. Corp. v. City ofBoise, 145 Idaho 958, 960, 188 P.3d 900, 902
(2008)). "Jurisdictional issues are questions oflaw over which this Court exercises free review."
T.J.T., Inc., 148 Idaho at 826, 230 P.3d at 436 (citing Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151,

219 P.3d 473, 475 (2009)).

Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2q10

46

ID.ANALYSIS
The Memorandum Decision concluded with a section entitled "Order" that states, in
pertinent part, as follows:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for

Summary Judgment filed by Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and Renewed Motion for
Summary Judmgnet [sic] filed in Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are
GRANTED." (capitalization, bold original).

In Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002), this Court attempted

to define the court documents that would constitute final judgments for purposes of I.A.R.
1 l(a)(l). 1 We stated:
Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be
determined by its content and substance, and not by its title. ldah Best, Inc. v.
First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A., 99 Idaho 517, 584 P.2d 1242 (1978). As a
general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit,
adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final
determination of the rights of the parties. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 63 7, 991
P.2d 362 (1999). It must be a separate document, Hunting v. Clark County School
Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,931 P.2d 628 (1997); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 58(a), that
on its face states the relief granted or denied.
137 Idaho at 867, 55 P.3d at 321.
Later, in In re Universe Life Insurance Co., this Court reiterated earlier statements that
"[a]n order granting summary judgment does not constitute a judgment."

144 Idaho 751, 756,

1

In recent months, this Court has repeatedly addressed the question of what constitutes an appealable order or
judgment, most notably in Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010),
Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588,226 P.3d 530 (2010) and T.J.T., Inc. v. Mori,
148 Idaho 825,230 P.3d 435 (2010). In an effort to reduce confusion, this Court has adopted significant changes to
the governing rules of civil and appellate procedure. Effective July I, 2010, I.A.R. 11 now provides:
An appeal as a matter of right may be taken to the Supreme Court from the following
judgments and orders:
(a) Civil Actions. From the following judgments and orders ofa district court in a civil action:
(I) Final judgments, as defined in Rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including
judgments of the district court granting or denying peremptory writs of mandate and prohibition.
I.R.C.P. 54(a) now defines ''.judgment" and "final judgment" as follows:
"Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled Judgment or Decree. A
judgment shall state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the
action. Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not contain a
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, courts legal reasoning,
findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment is final if either it has been certified as final
pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief,
except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action.
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171 P.3d 242, 247 (2007) (citing Camp; Hunting v. Clark Co. School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho
634, 931 P.2d 628 (1997)). More recently, in Spokane Structures, Inc. v. F,quitable Inv., UC,
148 Idaho 616, 619, 226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010), this Court explained that "[t]he judgment
sought is a final detennination of a claim or claims for relief in the lawsuit."

The Court

continued:
The relief to which a party is entitled is not the granting of a motion for summary
judgment. [Rule 54(c), I.R.C.P.] refers to the relief to which the party is
ultimately entitled in the lawsuit, or with respect to a claim in the lawsuit. The
granting of a motion for summary judgment is simply a procedural step towards
the party obtaining that relief.

Id
Thus, when faced with the situation where the trial court had entered an order granting
summary judgment, but no separate judgment was entered, this Court had no alternative but to
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. T.J.T., Inc., 148 Idaho at 826, 230 P.3d at 436. For
the same reason, this appeal must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION

This Court does not have jurisdiction to decide this appeal as no final and appealable
judgment was entered below. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Chief Justice EISMANN and Justices BURDICK, J. JONES and W. JONES CONCUR.
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STATE Of IDAHO
' SS
COUNTY OF KOOTENAlt
FILED:

Douglas P. Lawrence, Pro Se
Brenda J. Lawrence, Pro Se
Post Office Box 1027
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816-1027
Telephone: (208)-704-0644

2010 SEP -8 PM I: 24

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nJDIClAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS P. LAWREN CE and
BRENDA J. LAWRENCE, Husband

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-02-07671

DEFENDANTS LA WRENCES'
MOTION REQUESTING THE
COURT ENTER A FINAL
JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Douglas P. Lawrence, en Pro Se, and Brenda J. Lawrence, en Pro
Se and respectfully moves the Court pursuant to rule 54(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure for an entry of final judgment. This motion is supported by the Affidavit of
Douglas Lawrence in Support of Motion for Entry of Final Judgment together with the
matters on file herein.
On February 6, 2008, this court published a Memorandwn Decision and Order
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. At the time, the defendants

DEFENDANTS LAWRENCES' MOTION
REQUESTIN'G THE COURT ENTER A FINAL JUDGMENT - 1
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Lawrences were represented by John P. Whelan P.C., a licensed attorney in the State of
Idaho.
On March 19, 2008, John P. Whelan, filed a Notice of Appeal to take this issue up
with the Idaho Supreme Court.
On Sept. 9, 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court filed an order granting the withdrawal
of John P. Whelan as the Lawrences' legal consul. The Lawrences took the appeal up as
Pro Se Appellants.
On July 26, 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the appeal citing a lack of
jurisdiction because there is no judgment in the record. The Idaho Supreme Court later
withdrew this opinion and on August 25, 2010, issued an amended opinion. See Exhibit
A attached to the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Motion for Entry of Final
Judgment.
The Supreme Court concluded that:
Whether an instrument is an appealable order or judgment must be
determined by its content and substance, and not by its title. ldah Best, Inc. v.
First Security Bank ofIdaho, NA., 99 Idaho 517, 584 P.2d 1242 (1978). As a
general rule, a final judgment is an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit,
adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final
determination of the rights of the parties. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991
P.2d 362 (1999). It must be a separate document, Hunting v. Clark County
School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 634,931 P.2d 628 (1997); IDAHO R. CIV. P.
58(a), that on its face states the relief granted or denied. 137 Idaho at 867, 55
P.3d at 321.

DEFENDANTS LA WRENCES' MOTION
REQUESTING THE COURT ENTER A FINAL JUDGMENT - 2
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DATED this gm day ofSEPTE:rvfBER, 2010.
'

I

_,,/

Brenda J. Lawrence

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed via USPS and addressed
to:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks. P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

On this 8th day of SEPTE:rvfBER, 2010

DEFENDANTS LA WRENCES' MOTION
REQUESTING THE COURT ENTER A FINAL .TIJDGMENT - 3
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, ISB #4255
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERA TING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Case No. CV 02-7671

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DECLARING EASEMENT
RIGHTS

Defendants.
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment
on November 27, 2007. The Court having heard the argument of counsel, being fully advised in
the premises, and having issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion is Granted and the cou1i hereby declares that Plaintiff has an

ingress and egress easement by prescription; an easement implied by prior use and an easement
by necessity across Lawrences' parcel of property located in Section 21, Township 51 N01ih,
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARING
EASEMENT RIGHTS: 1
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Range 5 West, which easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and
incorporated herein.
2.

That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and

Plaintiffs tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and egress to its site.
DATED this

~ day of Se.r+e....L;r-,-wos.

CERTIFICATE O~ICE
I hereby certify that on the

il_ day of

~

, 2010, I caused to be served a

true and conect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:

D

U.S. Mail

Telecopy (FAX)

Douglas P. and Brenda J. Lawrence
P.O. Box 1027
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

D

Telecopy (FAX)

U.S.Mail

Susan P. Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 664-1684

'

;· '),"" .,'

l '.\
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BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD
30' ROAD EASEMENT
That ponion of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5
West, Bo1se Meridian, Kootenai Count)', 1daho, more panic.:ularly de~cribed as follows·

Commencing a.t the Southeast comer of Section 21, monumented by a 2 ½'' Zmc
cap, thence westerly along the south line of said section, South 89°27'43" West, 602.57
feet ~o the centt!rline of Apple Blossom Mountain Ro::1d :tnd the POfNT OF

BEGINNING.
thence continuing along said sect.ion line South 89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the
North right-of-way of Apple Blossom road,
thence leaving said section line and cominu.mg along the said North righ1-of-way
the following courses and distances;
thence 255.30 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of 750.23 feet, and a
long chord that bears Nonh 12°42 '32" East, 254.07 feet;
thence North 18°35'46"'£ast, 164.80 feet;
thence North 26°2 l '12" East, 43.85 feet;
thence 157.70 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of 90.06 feet, and a
long chord that bears North 79°21 '30" East, 138.32 feet;
thence South 50°55'04" East, 163.40 feet;
thence South 58°42'22" East, 163.84 feet;
thence South 61 °12'45" East, 54 65 feet;
thence South 64°56'20" East, 41.65 feei to the East line of Section 21;
thence leaving said right-of-way along said Section hne So um 00°19' 03" Eas1,
33 2U feet to tht: South nght-of-way of Apple Blossom Road;
thence continuing along said right-of-way the following courses and distance~
thence North 64°56 '20" West, 56.86 feet;
thence Nonh 61 °12'45" West, 56.28 feet;
'thence North 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet;
thenc:t: North 50°55'03" West, 165.66 feet;
thence 104.52 feet along a curve to the left having a radiu.s of 60.06 feet and a
long chord which bears South 79"41 '04" West, 91.82 feet;
thence South 26°21 '12" West, 40 99 fet!t,
thence South 18°35'46'' Wes1, 163.79 feet;
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thence 244.25 feer along a curve to the left, having a radius of 720.23 feer, and a
long chord tha[ bears South 12°49' 18" West, 243.09 feer to the South hne of Section
21;
thence leaving said right-of-way Westerly along said Section line South
89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
Containing 0.704 acres, more or less.

END OF DESCRIPTION
Prepared by:

J-U·B ENGINEERS, Inc.
Ronald M. Hodge, P.L.S.

RMH/fiU.'.'
f '1Pri!J.:c1,\2041·087 'h'eek5·J-Slu~sum l'vllflfblnt>•u111_lt!J__ c;rsr,n.:n1.11e>c
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation
Plaintiff,
VS.

DOUGLAS P. LA WREN CE and
BRENDA J. LAWREN CE, husband
and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-02-07671

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: The above-named Plaintiff, CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
and its attorney, Susan P. Weeks, and to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence,

appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the above-entitled action by
The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1
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2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Orders described in paragraph one (1) above are appealable Orders under and pursuant to
Rule 11 (a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
3.

Several primary orders are appealed in this appeal, including the February 6,

2008 order granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary judgment, together with the
trial court order denying Defendants' renewed motion for disqualification for cause.
4.

The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not limited to, the

following:
(a)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify
itself for cause?

(b)

In granting the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, are the

trial court findings supported by substantial and competent
evidence?
(c)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff
prejudgment access to Defendants' land without first requiring a
bond or undertaking?

(d)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only
two weeks to complete their discovery?

(e)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting Plaintiffs'
affidavits in their entirety over Defendant's objections?

(f)

Did the trail court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendant's
affidavits?

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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5.

(a) A reporter's transcript has already been prepared in this matter and were

forwarded to the Idaho Supreme Court as Docket Number 35120-2008.

(b) The Defendants request that judicial notice be taken of the following
transcripts:

6.

- June 13, 2007

Hearing re: Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment; Motion for Enlargement of Time;
Application for Order Shortening time; Motion
for Disqualification for Cause; Motion to Strike
Portions of Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence;
Motion to Strike Affidavit of John Mack

- August 6, 2007

Hearing re: Motion for Reconsideration; Motion
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory
Order

- August 7, 2007

Hearing re: Motion for Summary Judgment;
Motion for Enlargement of Time; Motion to
Strike; Request for Judicial Notice; Motion to
Strike all Whelan's Motions

- October 31, 2007

Hearing re: Motion to Shorten Time and
Application for Sixth Access

- November 27, 2007

Hearing re: Renewed Motion for
Disqualification for Cause; Motion to Substitute
Real Party in Interest; Renewed Motion to
Appeal and Interlocutory Order; Motion to
Continue Trial

A clerk's record has already been prepared in this matter to include the

documents specified in subsection (b)(l) of Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and
were forwarded to the Idaho Supreme Court as Docket Number 35120-2008. The

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
Capstar VS. Lawrence -- S.C. # 38300-2010

58

defendants request that judicial notice be taken of said clerk's record to include the
following documents:
(a)

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for summary
judgment together with all affidavits submitted in support of the motion.

(b)

Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary judgment
and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of the opposition to Plaintiffs
motion for summary judgment.

(c)

Defendants' renewed motion to disqualify for cause and all supporting briefs and
affidavits.

(d)

Defendants' original motion to disqualify for cause and all supporting briefs and
affidavits.

(e)

Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and affidavits in
support.

(t)

The original Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences'
Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23,
2004 in Case CV-02-7671.

7.

The Defendants request that the Clerk's record be augmented to include the

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Declaring Easement
Rights and this Notice of Appeal. Defendants further request that the Idaho Supreme
Court take judicial notice of all exhibits that have been offered in the course of the
various motions before the District Court that are, in whole or part, the subject of the
instant appeal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4
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8.

I hereby certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of the
District Court.
(b) Service has been made on all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this 10th day of November, 2010

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 10th day of November, 2010 I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below and
addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks. P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814

via: U.S. Mail, Postage prepaid

Julie Foland
Court Reporter
324 West Garden Ave.
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000

via: U.S. Mail, Postage prepaid

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 6
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Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
Atlorneys for Plaintiff
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Case No. CV 02-7671

~~E..-D

ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DECLARING EASEMENT
RIGHTS

Defendants.
This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs Renewed Motion for Summary .Judgment
on November 27, 2007. The Court having heard the argument of counsel, being fully advised in
the premises, and having issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS
FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiffs Motion is Granted and the corn1 hereby declares that Plai nliff has an

ingress and egress easement by prescription; an easement imp I ied by prior use and an easement
by necessity across Lawrences' parcel of property located in Section 2 l, Township 51 North,
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Range 5 WesL, which easement is more parllcularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and
incorporated herein.
That the Defendants are permanently restrained from interfering with Plaintiff and
Plaintiffs tenants use of Blossom Mountain Road for ingress and

to its site.

DATEDthis ~ d a y o f

'"--.

.

"- J
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

l_Q___ day of

~

, 2010, I caused to be served a

true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
U.S. Mail

D

Telecopy (FAX)

Douglas P. and Brenda J. Lawrence
P.O. Box 1027
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
U.S.Mail

Telecopy (FAX)

63

.)

BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD
30' ROAD EASEMENT
Thal ponion of the Southeasr 1/4 of Section 21, Township 50 Norrh, Range 5
West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, ldaho, more particularly dt!:scribed as follows·
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 21, monumented by a 2 ½'' Zmc
cap, thence wesrerly along the south line of said sec11on, Sourh 89°27'43" Wesr, 602.57
feei ro the centc::rline of Apple Blossom Mountain Rm-id :=md the. POJNT OF

BEGINNING.
thence continuing along said section line Sourh 89°27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the
Nonh righr-of-way of Apple Blossom road,
thence leaving said section line and comin1..1.1ng along the said Nonb righr-of-way
the following courses and distances;

!hence 255.30 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of 750.23 feet, and a
long chord that bears North 12°42 '32" East, 254.07 feet;
ihence North 18°35'46" Bast, 164.80 feet;
tht'!nce North 26°21 '12" East, 43.85 feet;
thence 157.70 feet along a curve to the right, having a radius of 90.06 feet, and a
long chor4 that bears North 79°21 '30" East, 138.32 feet;
thence Souib 50°55'04" fast, 163.40 feet;
thence South 58°42'22" Easr. 163.84 feet;
thence South 61 °12'45" East, 54 65 feet;
thence South 64°56 '20" East, 41.65 feei TO the East line of Section 21;

thence leaving said righr-of-way along said Section hne South 00°19'03" East,
33 2U feet to tht: South nghi-of-way of Apple Blossom Road;
rh~nce cominuing along said right-of-way the following courses and distance;
rhence North 64°56'20" West, 56.86 fret;
thence North 61 °12'45" West, 56.28 feet;
thence North 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet;
thenct North 50°55'03" West, 165.66 foet;
thence 104.52 feet along a curve ro the left having a radiu.s of 60.06 fo::1 and a
long chord which bears South 79"41 '04" West, 91.82 feet;
thence Somh 26°21 '12" West, 40 99 feet,
thence Sourh 18°35'46" Wes1, 163.79 feet;
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thence 244.25 feer along a curve 10 the left, having a ra.diLLs of720.23 fret, and a
long chard rhar bears Sourh 12°49' 18" West, 243.09 feet to the South lm.e of Secrion
2 l;
thence leaving said right-of-way Westerly u.long said Secuon line South
89"27'43" West, 15.03 feet to the POINT OF BEGlNNTNG.
Containing 0.704 acres, more or less.

END OF DESCRIPTlO N"
Prepared by:

J-U-B ENGINEERS, Inc.
Ronald M. Hodge, P.LS.

RMH/[l[.<.:
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IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING
COMPANY, a De[a,.vare Corporation,
Plaintiff/ Respondent,
VS.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and
BRENDA J. LA WREN CE, husband
Aand wife,

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
38300-2010

)

Defendants I Appellate,

)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
[, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State
ot' [daho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and

foregoing record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction
as, and is a true, full and coJTect record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of
the Idaho Appellate Rules. I further certify that exhibits were

1101

offered in this case.

I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town,
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid. on the~ day of Februarv, 20 l l.
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court. In witness whereot~ l have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
said Court at Kootenai County, Idaho this 11 TH day February, 2011.

CLIFFORD T. HA YES
Clerk of the District Court
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